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COMMENTS
BABE THE MAGNIFICENT ORGAN DONOR?
THE PERILS AND PROMISES SURROUNDING
XENOTRANSPLANTATION
God watches over us, cats look down on us, dogs look up to us,
and pigs look us right in the eye.'
In the United States alone, over 40,000 people remain on the organ
recipient waiting list each year.2 Several approaches have been taken to
increase the supply of human organs, but currently the demand far out-
strips the supply. 3 Xenotransplantation, the use of animal organs for
transplants into humans, is a response to the human organ shortage.4 On
September 23, 1996, the Public Health Service (PHS) issued draft guide-
lines (Guidelines) in the Federal Register governing xenotransplanta-
tion.5 The proposed Guidelines were open for a ninety-day comment
period, after which a final draft was to be issued.6 Working together, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
through a series of public meetings and submissions, created the Guide-
1. Attributed to Sir Winston Churchill.
2. Charles Marwick, British American Reports on Xenotransplantation, 276 JAMA
589, 589 (1994).
3. Id.; COMMITTEE ON XENOGRAFr TRANSPLANTATION: ETHICAL ISSUES AND PUB.
POL'Y, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, XENOTRANSPLANTATION: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 10-12 (1996) [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE].
4. INSTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 6. See Louisa E. Chapman et al., Sound-
ing Board: Xenotransplantation and Xenogenic Infections, 33 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1498, 1498
(1995). See also S. S. Kalter & R. L. Heberling, Xenotransplantation: and Infectious Dis-
eases, 37 INST. OF LABORATORY ANIMAL RESOURCES J. 31, 31, 35 (1995).
5. Xenotransplantation is a procedure to transplant animal organs, tissues and cells'
into humans. Xenos is "the Greek word for strange or foreign." See John Travis, The
Xeno-Solution, Sca. NEWS, Nov. 4, 1995, at 298.
See also Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xeno-
transplantation, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,920, 49,920 (1996).
6. Draft Public Health Service Guidelines on Infectious Disease Issues in Xenotrans-
plantation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 49,920-21 (1996). As of this writing, no subsequent draft has
been issued.
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lines and made them available for public comment.7
Xenotransplantation is not a new science, but it remains a largely un-
proven scientific endeavor, raising a host of questions.8 Among the tradi-
tional concerns, xenotransplantation trials raise concerns regarding
adequate informed consent, 9 acceptance of the donor organ by the do-
nee,' 0 and the availability of suitable organs for transplantation.'" Addi-
tionally, xenotransplantation raises several non-traditional concerns,
which are in part the impetus for the Guidelines. 2 Transplanting non-
human organs into a human introduces potential xenozoonoses, diseases
transmitted from animals to humans,' 3 in the organ recipient. While not
as common in allotransplantation (the transplantation of organs, tissues,
and cells between humans), xenotransplantation creates an environment
where an infection can be transmitted to a "close contact" of the organ
recipient.'"
Cross-species transmission of diseases has led to some spectacular
7. Id.
8. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 15-16.
9. Id. at 62.
10. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, ANIMAL TO HUMAN TRANSPLANTS: THE
ETHICS OF XENOTRANSPLANTATION, para. 1.3 (1996) [hereinafter NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS]. Because of the need to facilitate acceptance of the animal organ, doctors
employ immunosuppressive drugs. Id.
[11n patients with xenotransplants the diagnosis and management of familiar zoo-
noses may be complicated by immunologic manipulations that alter the clinical
presentation of illness, the reliability of antibody testing, and the response to ther-
apy. Infusions of bone marrow from the animal and other new strategies pro-
posed for manipulating the immune response of the host undergoing
xenotransplantation may also raise the risk of infectious disease. The intense im-
munosuppression of patients undergoing xenotransplantation may facilitate both
the amplification and the epidemic potential of pathogens.
Id.; see also Chapman, et al., supra note 4, at 1500.
11. Marian G. Michaels & Richard L. Simmons, Xenotransplant Associated Zoonoses,
57 TRANSPLANTATION 1, 4-5 (1994). Although xenotransplantation and xenografts are
measures to circumvent human organ shortage problems, some evidence suggests that the
use of non-human primates would be prohibitive at the onset because of the relatively low
numbers of primates that would be suitable as donors. Id. There is additional concern that
even the existing supply of baboons taken together would not fill the demand. See Rachel
Nowak, Xenotransplants Set to Resume, 266 SCIENCE 1148,1148 (1994). Finally, "there is a
realistic concern that only the rich will be able to afford lifesaving animal organs." See
Joseph Palca, Animal Organs for Human Patients? 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 4, 4 (1995).
12. See Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xeno-
transplantation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 49,920.
13. See Michaels & Simmons, supra note 11, at 1. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note
3, at 8.
14. See Chapman et al., supra note 4, at 1498-99.
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images in recent movies and books. 5 Unlike scenes depicted in these
movies and books, however, it is highly unlikely that xenotransplanta-
tion's greatest danger would come from a viral strain like Ebola, whose
short latency period, generally less than two weeks, makes it a poor can-
didate for a major outbreak. Ebola can be contained before it spreads
because it quickly causes death, giving the carrier little chance to infect
others.16 In contrast, the danger in a cross-species transmission would
involve a virus with a long latency period, like Human Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome Virus (HIV), which goes undetected in the donor
animal and could remain undetected in the host. 7 Moreover, xenotrans-
plantation raises new ethical issues regarding the breeding of animals
solely for their organs,' 8 some psychological issues for the recipient not
encountered in allotransplantations,' 9 and its possible negative impact on
human organ donation."z
Part I of this Comment establishes the context of xenotransplantation
by describing the current state of human organ transplantation. Part II
examines several of the relevant statutory provisions under which the
first clinical trials will be governed. This Comment then assesses xeno-
transplantation, detailing the science, the early and recent cases, and
probing the ethics. It also discusses the differences between the British
approach and the American approach.
Part V concludes that xenotransplantation clinical trials should pro-
ceed, if at all, only with great caution and subject to several restraints.
15. Movies like Outbreak and the recent Tom Clancy book EXECUTIVE ORDERS are
two examples from a long list.
16. See Chapman et al., supra note 4, at 1498-99. Ebola's latency period is five to
twelve days. Containment procedures can be initiated quickly because the host will begin
to exhibit symptoms, 80% of the time ending in death. In a virus with a lengthier latency
period, it is able to spread more broadly because the host has not begun to show symptoms
and will continue to spread the virus unknowingly. Id.
17. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at para. 6.14. The specter of
a virus with a lengthy latency period like HIV is a controverted topic. Id. See also Palca,
supra note 11, at 4.
18. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at para. 4.1-4.54.
19. See INSTnUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 16. Many transplant recipients feel
sadness associated with their gain because of the death of another. But the families of the
organ donor sometimes are solaced by the fact that the death of a loved one gave another
an opportunity to live. How xenotransplantation may affect these emotions and the emo-
tions of recipients who know that they have a non-human organ are still to be determined.
Id.
20. See id. at 16. For example, "[p]eople who have received human organ transplants
often report having deep and complex emotions about having another person's organ in
their bodies." Id.
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Risk to third parties cannot be discounted, and until reliable methods for
providing organs free of potential pathogens2' are established, the initial
recipients need to be monitored closely. They should be required to sub-
mit names of all sexual and close contacts,22 including past, present, and
future contacts. Moreover, when the patient is notified that xenotrans-
plantation may be an option, she must consent to the necessary restric-
tions after being informed of them. Informed consent should include a
waiver of the right to withdraw from the clinical trial. Finally, early xeno-
transplantations should be conducted only when no other alternatives are
available.




Demand for xenotransplantation arises from the undersupply of
human organs for transplantation. 4 Currently, over 40,000 people each
year are on waiting lists for organs.25 The greatest successes in allotrans-
plantations are kidney transplants, with heart and other organ transplants
on the rise.2 6 Increased success rates are largely the result of improved
immunosuppression, 27 which prevents the donor organ from being re-
21. A pathogen is: "Any virus, microorganism, or other substance causing disease."
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICIONARY 1312 (26th ed. 1995).
22. A "close contact" is defined as "household members and others with whom the
recipient participates in activities that could result in exchanges of body fluids." See Draft
Public Health Service Guidelines on Infectious Disease Issues in Xenotransplantation, 61
Fed. Reg. 49,920, 49,923 (1996).
23. This subheading is borrowed, in part, from Guido Calabresi and Phillip Bobbitt's
book, TRAGIC CHOICES, which provides an excellent discussion of the choices people
confront when supply of an important good is limited. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILLIP
BOBB-r, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
24. PHS in its Guidelines, succinctly described this shortage.
The demand for human cells, tissues, and organs for clinical transplantation con-
tinues to exceed the supply. The resultant limited availability of human allografts,
coupled with recent scientific and biotechnical advances, has prompted the devel-
opment of new investigational therapeutic approaches that use cells, tissues, and
organs of animal origin (xenografts) in human recipients.
Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xenotransplanta-
tion, 61 Fed. Reg. at 49,921.
25. See Marwick, supra note 2, at 589.
26. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at para. 1.3-1.9. See also
INsTrrTUrE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 11.
27. See Joan Stephenson, Xenotransplantation Workshop Ponders Science, Safety of
Animal Tissue Grafts, 274 JAMA 285, 285 (1995). Xenotransplantation has only become
viable due to the "revolution in techniques for immunosuppression." Id.
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jected by the recipient's immune system. National registries also have
facilitated better matches between organ donors and recipients."8 De-
spite the progress of the medical and scientific communities in allotrans-
plantations, their continued success hinges on access to an adequate
supply of human organs, which is currently lacking. 9 Notwithstanding
national campaigns 30 to increase public awareness of the need to donate,
organ donation has not increased sufficiently. In fact, donation may even
decrease depending on the type of campaign that is launched. 31 This
phenemonenon occurs because people feel that no need exists for them
to register to donate; the necessary organs can or will be obtained
elsewhere.
B. The National Organ Transplant Act32
The history of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) identifies
some issues posed by xenotransplantation. Congress enacted NOTA to
address several areas of concern, including: establishing national regis-
tries; ensuring organs were not allocated on the basis of wealth; and, pro-
viding uniform regulations to be followed in organ procurement.33
Congress was particularly concerned not only with the lack of organ do-
nors, but also with issues of equity. 34 These issues need to be dealt with
in xenotransplantations. One future critic, then Representative Albert
Gore, was quite optimistic about NOTA's prospects when it was passed,
only to be disappointed by its subsequent implementation. 35 This sug-
gests the necessity of carefully reviewing xenotransplantion decisions to
ensure that such decisions are insulated, to the greatest extent possible,
28. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274b(2)(i)-(ii) (1996) (establishing
a national list to match donors to recipients).
29. See Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L.
69, 70 (1994).
30. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 13.
31. See id. at 16.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74g (1994).
33. See id.
34. See 136 CONG. REc. S13625, S13626 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Quayle). Both sides of the aisle were concerned with putting an equitable system into
place. Senator Dan Quayle felt NOTA would "help us provide what has been lacking - a
national, equitable policy related to transplantation." Id. On the other side, Senator Ken-
nedy felt NOTA was "the most equitable and effective way of distributing organs, and the
best methods of financing the cost of organ procurement and transplantation." 136 CONG.
REc. S13625, S13627 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1984) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
35. Representative Gore had "every hope and expectation that this legislation [would]
save many thousands of lives. It represents a true compromise." 136 CONG. REc.
H11087-88 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (statement of Rep. Gore).
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from any political partisanship. Partisan politics should not determine
what action to take on xenotransplantation; the stakes are too high.
Partisan politics spilled over into the debate concerning why organ do-
nor numbers had plateaued as early as 1990.36 Each political party criti-
cized the effectiveness of NOTA for opposite reasons. On one side, then
Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee criticized both the Reagan and Bush
administrations for actively failing to execute NOTA's policies.37 On the
other side, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah was critical of the amount of
congressional abdication that was taking place with respect to NOTA's
implementation.38 Hatch argued that allowing the United Network for
Organ Sharing (UNOS) to implement guidelines without any executive
action violated a long line of United States Supreme Court decisions.39
In essence, the Guidelines represent the opposite situation NOTA
presented, almost total executive control and no Congressional action.
Congress has failed to take any action on xenotransplantation issues,
thereby leaving the policy solely within the control of the executive
branch. This control issue may need to be examined if the Guidelines
would allow independent contractors to act on behalf of the federal gov-
ernment. 40 Furthermore, because of the possible negative impact xeno-
transplantation could have on the public health, Congress, as the most
politically accountable branch, should exercise a greater degree of
oversight.
36. See 136 CONG. REC. S18236, S18240 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy). Speaking on the Senate Floor, Senator Ted Kennedy pointed to a two-year gap
between the enactment of NOTA and its effective implementation. The system has gradu-
ally improved donation rates, but, "[t]he number of organ donors has reached a plateau;
the national focus of the referral system needs to be strengthened; and performance stan-
dards for organ procurement organizations must be developed." Id.
37. Senator Albert Gore accused the Reagan Administration of "footdragging" and
more generally criticizing the Bush Administration. 136 CONG. REC. S18236, S18240 (daily
ed. Oct. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Gore). Senator Gore stated that since 1986 the pub-
lic's focus on NOTA related issues was drawn away by several things, but "none is more
frustrating or disheartening than the miserable job the President and his administration are
doing to implement the laws we have enacted." Id.
38. See 136 CONG. REC. S18236, S18242 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). Senator Orrin Hatch argued that Congress was unconstitutionally delegating its
power by allowing the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), to take on executive
functions. Id.
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 239-54 (discussing the potential for biotechnology companies to
monitor xenotransplant recipients and close contacts and provide informed consent).
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C. Ethical Considerations in Allotransplantations
One of the primary ethical concerns in human organ donation is sepa-
rating the dire need of a person waiting to receive an organ from the
potential donor's life interests.41 Included in these concerns is the poten-
tial donor's family, who also has an interest in maintaining the dignity of
the dying individual.4 2 In some cases, time can pressure decisions be-
cause a medical team may be preparing the individual for the transplant
while the organ is being harvested from the donor.43
Another ethical consideration surrounds live donors giving an organ,
tissue, or bone marrow to a recipient.44 The danger of coercion may exist
in these situations, particularly when a family member is involved, with
the live donor possibly feeling obligated to provide the necessary organ
or tissue for the recipient. 45 Although a national registry exists for bone
marrow donors, maintaining lists of individuals willing to donate, the
number of suitable donors is, as with organs, below the demand.46 This
leaves open the possibility of coercion where a family member is able, but
unwilling, to donate.
D. Alternatives to Increase the Supply of Organs
1. Changing the Law
One proposal to increase the supply of human organs is the enactment
of legislation to call for presumed consent.47 Presumed consent would
permit the removal of organs for donation where no express wish to the
41. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BioETHIcs, supra note 10, at para. 2.9.
42. Id. at 82. Often, the potential donor has expressed no interest in donation. This
leaves the family with the decision of whether organs should be removed for donation.
Even if the dying individual expressed a wish to donate, emergency room physicians find it
difficult to overrule the wishes of the family if it disallows removal of the organs. Id.
43. See, e.g., Steve Reinbrecht, Visitors His Salvation in Long Wait for Heart, READING
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1995, at 1; see also, Marla K. Clark, Note, Solving the Kidney Shortage
Crisis Through the Use of Non-Heart-Beating Cadaveric Organs: Legal Endorsement of
Perfusion as a Standard Procedure, 70 IND. L.J. 929, 935 (1995).
44. See INSTrUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 11. Several types of live donor trans-
plants occur where the donor only needs one of a paired organ set to live, as in the case of
a kidney. Bone marrow is another example of a procedure that is performed with a live
donor. Id.
45. See Joel D. Kallich & Jon F. Merz, The Transplant Imperative: Protecting Living
Donors from the Pressure to Donate, 20 J. CORP. LAW 139, 145 (1995).
46. See National Bone Marrow Registry, 42 U.S.C. § 274k(a)(1994) (establishing a na-
tionwide registry of bone marrow donors).
47. See Cate, supra note 29, at 83-84.
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contrary has been provided."8 Currently, even though public support for
donation is high, the legal presumption is that consent to donate does not
exist.49 Only two ways of bypassing this presumption exist: first, to sign
an organ donor card; and second, to gain the consent of the next-of-kin. °
Both of these alternatives seem to be ineffective methods of circum-
venting the legal presumption against consent.51 While changing the laws
simply to reflect public opinion polls may not be justified, it is an indica-
tion that legislation in this area would receive public support.
Another proposal would allow for compensation of those agreeing to
donate organs.52 While this is statutorily prohibited,53 it can be argued
that since all others involved in the process are compensated in some
form, so too should the donor.5 4 However, selling organs for transplanta-
tion could adversely affect the number of individuals willing to donate for
purely altruistic reasons55 and may well defeat the purpose by actually
decreasing the overall numbers of organs donated. Because donation
rates are fragile, the decrease in donation by non-paid donors may offset
the additional organs made available by compensating donors. 6 In other
words, to pay donors for their organs might actually decrease the number
of available organs below current levels.
2. Changing the Oil
Technological innovations are moving toward increasing the availabil-
48. Id. In practice, this could be difficult to implement because in some cases it could
conflict with the wishes of the family. Further, whether this approach would raise the level
of available organs enough to meet the demand is not clear. Id.
49. See id. at 81.
[D]espite overwhelming public support for transplantation, current law assumes
that no one wishes to donate organs or tissues upon death. According to a 1990
Gallup poll, ninety-four percent of Americans report having heard or read about
organ transplants; eighty-four percent believe that transplants are successful in
prolonging and improving the quality of life; eighty-nine percent said that they
were likely to honor loved ones' requests that their organs be donated after their
death.
Id.
50. Id. at 81-82.
51. Id. at 82-83.
52. Id. at 84-85.
53. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1996).
54. See Cate, supra note 29, at 85. The transplant removal team, the implanting team,
hospitals, among many others, all receive compensation. Id.
55. See Sheldon F. Kurtz & Michael J. Saks, The Transplant Paradox: Overwhelming
Public Support for Organ Donation vs. Under-Supply of Organs: The Iowa Organ Procure-
ment Study, 21 J. CORP. L. 767, 792 (1996).
56. Id.
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ity of mechanical devices that can perform functions of human organs.57
These efforts have included attempts to make mechanical hearts, lungs
and kidneys.58 Although mechanical devices are more readily available
now, the preference is still for an organic source. 59
II. EXISTING REGULATIONS GOVERNING
XENOTRANSPLANTATION TRIALS
A. Basic Health and Human Services Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects6
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) requires that
"all research involving human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise
subject to regulation by any federal department or agency ...,,61 must
comply with several requirements. Xenotransplantation trials would fall
under federal regulation in several respects.
To begin with, any institution engaging in research subject to regulation
must submit written assurances that it will comply with the regulations.62
The regulations require that at least one institutional review board (IRB)
be established. IRBs must also meet membership requirements, includ-
ing minimum membership numbers,63 and background requirements for
members.' IRBs can review proposed research, provided a majority of
57. See Cate, supra note 29, at 69.
58. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at para. 2.11-2.32.
59. This would include either a human or an animal organ.
60. See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46
(1996).
61. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a).
62. These assurances:
shall at a minimum include: (1) A statement of principles governing the institu-
tion in the discharge of its responsibilities for protecting the rights and welfare of
human subjects of research conducted at or sponsored by the institution, regard-
less of whether the research is subject to federal regulation.... (2) Designation of
one or more IRBs established in accordance with the requirements of this policy,
and for which provisions are made for meeting space and sufficient staff to sup-
port the IRB's review and recordkeeping duties. (3) A list of IRB members
identified .... (4) Written procedures which the IRB will follow .... (5) Written
procedures for ensuring prompt reporting to the IRB, appropriate institutional
officials, and the department or agency head of (i) any unanticipated problems
involving risks to subjects or others or any serious or continuing noncompliance
with this policy or the requirements or determinations of the IRB and (ii) any
suspension or termination of IRB approval.
45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b).
63. The minimum number is five. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a).
64. At least one member must be unaffiliated with the institution in any respect; one
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the members of the IRB board are present, including at least one mem-
ber with a nonscientific background. 65
IRBs ensure that adequate informed consent is given to participants.66
Because participation is voluntary and may be discontinued at any time,
the current policy would need to be addressed for xenotransplant recipi-
ents.67 For reasons discussed below, IRBs should be required to inform
xenotransplant recipients of several other factors.68
HHS regulations also require maintenance of records by the IRBs for a
minimum three-year period.69 This minimum provision would need to be
extended to provide for the potential latency periods of as-yet-undiag-
nosed pathogens. 70 The HHS regulations require that the "[r]isks to sub-
jects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects,
and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to
result. ' 7' This provision may be problematic because, to date, there have
been no tremendous successes for xenotransplantations. 7' Additional
must be a scientist; one must be something other than a scientist; and no member may have
a conflicting interest. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(b)-(e).
65. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.108(b).
66. The following information is required:
(1) A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the purposes
of the research and the expected duration of the subject's participation, a descrip-
tion of the procedures to be followed, and identification of any procedures which
are experimental;
(2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the
subject;
(3) A description of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reason-
ably be expected from the research;
(4) A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if
any, that might be advantageous to the subject;
(5) A statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records
identifying the subject will be maintained; ...
(1) A statement that participation is voluntary... and the subject may discon-
tinue participation at any time ....
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (emphasis added). The IRB may provide additional information if it
will help to protect the welfare of the patient. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(b).
67. Id. Continuing participation in xenotransplant trials should be made mandatory,
with no possibility of discontinuing, thereby recognizing the public health considerations.
See infra text accompanying notes 258-60.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
69. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.115(b). The minimum requirement would need to be extended
to provide adequate monitoring of xenotransplant recipients and their close contacts.
70. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 44. Because viruses with unknown
latency periods exist, xenotransplantation poses special risks. Id.
71. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2).
72. For a discussion of the Baby Fae case, see Joanne Silberner, Postmortem in Baby
Fae, 128 Sci. NEWS, Dec. 21, 1985, at 390; for a discussion of the recent Jeff Getty case, see
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regulations are set forth to protect activities involving fetuses, pregnant
women, in vitro fertilizations, prisoners, and children. 73 Due to the un-
certainty surrounding xenotransplantation, applying the ethical advisory
board approach74 to xenotransplantation procedures is appropriate.
III. XENOTRANSPLANTATION: READY OR NOT, HERE IT COMES75
A. The Science
1. Xenotransplantation
Xenotransplantation involves placing a non-human organ into a human
recipient. Early trials will use the non-human organ as a bridge until a
suitable human organ is available.7 6 Researchers hope that eventually
the procedure will work well enough so that animal organs can be used
interchangeably with human organs.7 7 The first step in the process is to
find a suitable animal donor. This is similar to the matching process em-
ployed in allotransplantations.7 8 Much like allotransplants, the recipient
must receive drugs, following the transplant, to decrease the response of
the immune system which recognizes the organ as foreign.7 9 Ordinarily,
the body's immune system fights infections by recognizing foreign protein
strains.80 When an organ is transplanted, no matter how closely it is
matched, rejection at some level will occur. This is because the body's
immune system is extremely effective at recognizing foreign surface pro-
Baboon Cells Fail to Join With AIDS Patient's Cells, AIDS WKLY., Feb. 19, 1996, at 40; for a
discussion of the earlier cases see infra text accompanying notes 132-153.
73. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.202-46.409.
74. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.204. "One or more Ethical Advisory Boards shall be estab-
lished by the Secretary. Members of these board(s) shall be so selected that the board(s)
will be competent to deal with medical, legal, social, ethical, and related issues .... " Id.
§ 46.204(a).
75. Jonathan Allan continues to be the most vocal opponent of the Draft Guidelines.
"Jonathan S. Allan, D.V.M. is a scientist in the Department of Virology and Immunology,
Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research, San Antonio, Texas." See Jonathan S.
Allan, Xenograft Transplantation and the Infectious Disease Conundrum, 37 INST. OF
LABORATORY ANIMAL RESOURCES J. 37, 37n. (1995). Regarding the commencement of
clinical trials Allan states, "[t]ransplant specialists are determined to proceed with studies
directed toward xenogeneic transplantation. Over 30 years have gone into its development
.Id. at 45.
76. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 8; see also Kalter & Heberling, supra
note 4, at 31, 35.
77. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 44.
78. Id. at 17-18.
79. Id. at 17-26.
80. Id. at 26.
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teins, which will be present in the tissue from the donor.81 The only ex-
ception occurs in donations from one identical twin to another.82 To
promote the success of the transplant, the recipient ingests drugs to sup-
press the immune system, which also makes the recipient more suscepti-
ble to ordinary diseases.8 3 Arguably, recipients from an animal donor are
likely to become carriers for a variety of pathogens, both zoonoses and
human diseases.84 Another reason why there is increased likelihood that
humans will become carriers is that as phylogenetic distance, or the mea-
sure of the genetic distance between species,85 increases, so too does the
level of the immune system's rejection.86 As the phylogenetic distance
increases between the animal donor and the human recipient, the
strength of immunosuppressive drugs must be increased to accommodate
the body's more virulent rejection.87 Hyperacute rejection, 88 or total re-
jection of the organ almost immediately, is a danger inherent in xeno-
transplantation. This danger increases the further away phylogenetically
the donor moves from a human organ. Thus, transplanting a non-human
primate organ into a human recipient will require a greater level of im-
munosuppression in the recipient than the same procedure involving a
human organ;89 and a pig organ will involve an even greater level of im-
munosuppression in the recipient than the organ from the non-human
primate. 90
2. Transgenesis9'
One method of addressing the problem of hyperacute rejection by the
recipient's immune system would be to alter the genetic make-up of the
material to be transplanted to prevent the recipient's immune system
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Stephenson, supra note 27, at 285. Xenotransplantation has become viable
due to the "revolution in techniques for immunosuppression." Id.
84. See Chapman et al., supra note 4, at 1498-99. Not only may a human carry the
animal disease but recombination of viral strains may occur with nascent strains in the
recipient. Id.
85. See INS-nTUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 17. The closest animal to humans
phylogenetically is the chimpanzee. Id.
86. Id. at 17-18.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 18-20.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id. at 17.
91. "In transgenic modification, either all cells of the animal contain the foreign gene
(transgene) which is incorporated stably into their genome expressing the protein, or only
selected cells contain it." Id. at 30.
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from recognizing it as foreign. 92 This would avoid the problem of exces-
sive doses of immunosuppression therapy where an opportunistic infec-
tion could invade the host's weakened immune system and cause more
severe illness or death.93 Transgenesis would require that one or two
genes94 from the recipient be incorporated into the donor animal tissue
prior to the transplantation. 95 The donor animal organ would then be
transplanted into the human recipient with the modified genetic mate-
rial.96 If this procedure works as expected, the modified organ would be
accepted through identification of genetic markers as "self" thus averting
rejection. 97
3. Bone Marrow Chimerism
Another method of avoiding high levels of immunosuppression is to
achieve a bone marrow chimerism. First, as in transgenesis, portions of
the donor bone marrow are implanted into the recipient before trans-
planting the organ.98 Next, radiation Would be used to decrease the levels
of the recipient's own bone marrow to prevent the recipient's immune
system from recognizing the donor's marrow as foreign.9 9 Finally, the do-
nor organ would be transplanted into the recipient.°° Doctors/scientists
expect that the donor marrow will begin to work with the recipient's own
bone marrow to form a hybrid or chimera which would reject neither the
recipient's own organs nor the organ transplanted from the donor. 1'
4. Other Alternatives
More modest examples of xeno-technology already are employed in
allotransplants.' 2 Pig heart valves are used in human heart transplants
but they are modified to prevent rejection by the immune system. °3 One
92. Id.
93. Id. at 30.
94. Id. at 30-32.
95. Id. at 30. The genes would be transplanted into the nucleus of a fertilized egg.
Only the mature adult would be modified. Id.
96. Id. at 31.
97. See Stephenson, supra note 27, at 285.
98. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 33-34.
99. See Stephenson, supra note 27, at 285; see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note
3, at 33-34.
100. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 36.
101. Id. at 33.
102. For example, "pig heart valves have been transplanted into human beings for more
than 30 years." See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIoETHICs, supra note 10 at para. 6.12.
103. Id. But the process that the pig heart valves undergo before transplantation ren-
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alternative to a complete organ transplantation entails transplanting cells
and tissues from a non-human donor into a human, so as to replicate the
function of faulty cells. 10
4
5. The Pig as Donor
Using pigs as alternative donors to non-human primates offers several
advantages. One such consideration is the availability of gnotobiotic, or
germ free pigs. 105 Another is that objections to the use of pigs would be
less fierce because, unlike non-human primates, pigs are a common
source of food and other items.106 The Nuffield Bioethics Committee,
along these lines, concluded in its second report that using pigs was ethi-
cally acceptable, while using primates was unacceptable. °7 Several
problems would still need to be overcome before the pig could be consid-
ered a viable alternative, including preventing the recipient's rejection of
the organ.' 0 8 Pigs are further from humans phylogenetically, and this is
problematic because less is known about the possible diseases they may
carry. Researchers in Britain discovered the possibility for transmission
of retroviruses from pigs to humans which was, in part, the reason for
Great Britain's moratorium on clinical trials.'0 9  When scientists an-
nounced the cloning of Dolly the sheep, cloning pigs for use in xenotrans-
plantations became a stronger possibility."0 Because cloned pigs would
be identical in all respects, once a specific-pathogen-free pig was devel-
oped it could be cloned and quarantined, which avoids the risk of viral or
disease transmission from mother to offspring."' The recent discovery of
porcine endogenous retroviruses, however, may stall, indefinitely, the use
of pigs in clinical trials." 2
ders them unlikely candidates for spreading disease because they are so substantially al-
tered and chemically treated. This modification is not viable for most other organs and
tissues. Id.
104. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 13-15.
105. See D. K. C. Cooper, The Pig as Potential Organ Donor for Man, in XENOTRANS-
PLANTATION, THE TRANSPLANTATION OF ORGANS AND TISSUES BETWEEN SPECIES 481,
482 (D. K. C. Cooper et al. eds., 1991).
106. Id. at 481.
107. See Peter J. Morris, Pig Transplants Postponed Until We Know More About Graft
Rejection, Physiology, and Inefectivity, 314 BRITISH MED. J. 242 (1997).
108. Id.
109. See Jacqui Wise, Pig Virus Transfer Threatens Xenotransplantation, 314 BRITISH
MED. J. 623 (1997).
110. See Robert Winston, The Promise of Cloning for Human Medicine: Not a Moral
Threat But an Exciting Challenge, 314 BRITISH MED. J. 913 (1997).
111. See infra text accompanying note 113 and notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
112. See Rick Weiss, Viruses in Pig Organs Could Infect Humans, WASH. POST, Oct. 16,
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B. The Viruses
1. Endogenous Infection and Exogenous Infection
Viral infections may take two primary routes. Endogenous infection
occurs when genes are passed from mother to offspring; this is called a
vertical transmission. 113 An exogenous infection is the most common
route and comes from another animal. 114 In nature, this can occur from
contact with an animal, from insect to human, or from contact with an-
other non-human primate. 5 Other routes, which are not common, in-
volve a latent or chronic infection integrating a host cell." 6
2. Herpesviruses
These viruses "are of greatest concern and probably present the great-
est challenge in terms of xenotransplants."' 17 While some viruses are
thought to be "species specific,"" 8 others are benign in the host but be-
come malevolent when they cross species.'1 9 Macaque monkeys are
known to be carriers of the B virus which causes symptoms similar to
herpes in human beings. When human beings are introduced to this virus,
and not treated, it is fatal.' ° Herpesviruses are the most common viruses
associated with allotransplantations and, therefore, necessitate a great
deal of attention and concern for xenotransplantations.12 1 A plethora of
herpesviruses found in different species of monkeys raise concerns when
they are isolated and then cross into a different species. Some of these
herpesviruses can be oncogenic;12 2  others can cause infectious
mononucleosis; 23 and others can cause more common forms of
1997, at A8. Jonathan P. Stoye and Robin Weiss, virologists at the National Institute for
Medical Research in London, announced the discovery of the viruses, which belong to the
same family as the human immunodeficiency syndrome. Id. For a discussion of endoge-
nous retroviruses, see infra text accompanying notes 113-16, 125-29.
113. S. S. Kalter, The Nonhuman Primate as Potential Organ Donor for Man: Virologi-
cal Considerations, in XENOTRANSPLANTATION, THE TRANSPLANTATION OF ORGANS AND
TISSUES BETWEEN SPECIES 457, 459 (D. K. C. Cooper et al. eds., 1991).
114. Id. at 459.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 460.
117. Id. at 461.
118. Michaels & Simmons, supra note 11, at 1-2.
119. Id. at 2-3.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Id., See also Kalter, supra note 113, at 461.
122. H. saimiri and H. tamarinus are examples of natural infections in one species, but
oncogenic in another. Kalter, supra note 113, at 462.
123. Epstein-Barr virus. Id. at 462.




Retroviruses are named for reverse transcriptase, an enzyme that tran-
scribes the viral RNA into the DNA.125 In non-human primates, a re-
trovirus of particular interest is the simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV),
which causes symptoms similar to HIV-2 in non-human primates.
126
Combining the symptoms of SIV with its genetic similarities to HIV, sug-
gests HIV may be of primate origin. 127 This demonstrates to researchers
the possibility that SIV, like HIV, may have a lengthy latency period
which would have a great deal of significance for xenotransplantation
procedures. 28 Additionally, retroviruses are associated with cancers and
other human and non-human diseases. 2 9
4. Filoviruses
Perhaps the most spectacular and least understood of the viruses dis-
cussed herein are the filoviruses. Examples of filoviruses include the
much publicized strains of Ebola. The source(s) of these viruses remains
unknown.130 These viruses are generally short lived and result in acute
outbreaks because of their short latency periods. As such, they do not
present much risk to xenotransplantation recipients, provided proper iso-
lation of the donor animal occurs prior to the procedure.' 31
C. The Early Cases
The earliest case of a xenotransplantation to receive notoriety involved
the transplantation of a baboon heart into a fifteen-day-old infant. 132 The
infant, known only as Baby Fae, survived twenty days with the baboon
heart.'3 3 Baby Fae, however, was not the first human to receive a
124. Id. at 462-464.
125. Michaels & Simmons, supra note 11, at 3.
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3-4.
129. See Kalter, supra note 113, at 468.
130. Michaels & Simmons, supra note 11, at 4.
131. See Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xeno-
transplantation, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,920, 49,925-26 (1996).
132. See Dan Chu, Helped by a Baboon's Heart, An Imperiled Infant, Baby Fae, Beat the
Medical Odds, PEOPLE WKLY., Nov. 19, 1994, at 71; Medicines Brave New Babies, LIFE,
Jan. 1985, at 40; Joanne Silberner, Postmortem in Baby Fae, Sci. NEws, Dec. 21, 1985, at
390.
133. See Silberner, supra note 72, at 390.
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xenotransplant.
in 1964, six patients received chimpanzee kidneys, with the longest re-
cipient surviving nine months.13 4 Interestingly, as early as 1969, research-
ers proposed that "[t]he establishment of breeding programs for
chimpanzees and other non-human primates should receive the highest
priority."' 35 However, since chimpanzees are now an endangered spe-
cies, they are not considered as possible donors. The next xenotrans-
plantation also took place in 1964 using baboon kidneys, and again, six
patients underwent the operation.' 36 Four of the patients lived for a pe-
riod ranging from nineteen to forty-nine days.1 37 The remaining two pa-
tients received allotransplants after forty-nine and sixty days but died
after thirty-nine and forty-four days, respectively, following the allotrans-
plantations.138 In all but one of the patients, the procedure failed due to
a failure to control rejection. 139 Physicians noted that, "the vigor of the
immunologic reaction has seemed to be much less with chimpanzee tis-
sue, in contrast to baboon and rhesus monkey heterotransplants which
evoke a fierce response on the part of the human host."'4n
Aside from a sheep heart being transplanted into a patient who died
instantly, no more significant trials, using non-human primates as donors,
were attempted until Baby Fae.14 1 The procedure was criticized for fail-
ing to consider alternatives, including waiting for a suitable human or-
gan142 and using an infant as a guinea pig for a procedure doomed from
the beginning. 43 Yet, Dr. Leonard Bailey, who performed the Baby Fae
procedure, defends the transplantation, saying "the compassionate effort
to save an infant's life got lost in a quagmire of professional and public
134. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIoETHICs, supra note 10, at table 3.1; see also Keith
Reemsta, Renal Heterotransplantation from Nonhuman Primates to Man, 162 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci. 412 (1969).
135. Reemsta, supra note 134, at 417; see also Michaels & Simmons, supra note 11, at 4-
5.
136. See T. E. Starzl et al., Renal Heterotransplantation from Baboon to Man: Experi-
ence With 6 Cases, 2 TRANSPLANTATION 752 (1964).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 772.
140. Id. at 773-774.
141. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at table 3.1.
142. See Human Heart Not Sought for Baby Fae, SAN DIEGO TRm., Oct. 29, 1984, at
A4.
143. For a harsh criticism of the procedure by Dr. Bailey and for overall doubts about
xenotransplantation's prospects for success, see Jerold M. Lowenstein, The Transplant Gap,
DISCOVER, June, 1993, at 25.
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rhetoric.' 144 Dr. Bailey notes that Baby Fae did not die from a rejection
of the baboon heart, but instead from an incompatible blood type.1 45 He
contends Baby Fae would have survived the operation if a baboon donor
with a compatible blood type had been used.
146
Attracting a great deal of attention recently was the plight of a thirty-
seven year old AIDS patient in the final stages of the disease. 47 Jeff,
Getty petitioned the FDA for permission to pursue a xenotransplant pro-
cedure, in which he would receive bone marrow from a baboon, because
they are inherently resistant to HIV.148 Following the introduction of the
baboon bone marrow, Getty was given radiation treatment to promote
chimerism between the donor marrow and his own. 1 49 After receiving
the approval of both the University of Pittsburgh's IRB and the Univer-
sity of California, San Francisco's IRB, the FDA agreed to allow the pro-
cedure to go forward for the limited purpose of establishing the safety of
the procedure, not the effectiveness.1 50 Getty's improved health was at-
tributed to radiation treatment rather than the xenotransplant.151 In fact,
it appears that the baboon marrow failed to engraft at all, so that from a
xenotransplantation perspective, the operation was not a success. 52 The
only encouraging aspect, to proponents of xenotransplantation, is that no
evidence of viral transmissions from the donor to the recipient exists.153
It remains too early to judge the procedure a total success from the viral
aspect because Getty could be a carrier of a virus with a long latency
period.
144. Leonard L. Bailey, Organ Transplantation: A Paradigm of Medical Progress, THE
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb., 1990, at 24.
145. Id. This incompatibility of blood type would cause problems in an allotransplanta-
tion as well. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Clare Thompson, No Cheers for Baboon to AIDS Patient Xenotransplant, 346
THE LANCET 369 (1995); Animal-to-Human Transplants Raise Concerns, AIDS WKLY.
PLUS, Mar. 18, 1996, at 32.
148. There are, however, "several doubts as to whether baboon cells are truly resistant
to HIV." See Thompson, supra note 147, at 369.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
150. See Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Test Involving Baboon is Approved, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1995, at § 1, page 7, col. 1.
151. See Janet Fricker, Barrier to Transplacental Exchange; Baboon Xenotransplant
Fails But Patient Improves, 347 THE LANCET 457 (1996); Baboon Cells Fail to Join With
AIDS Patient's Cells, AIDS WKLY. PLUS, Feb. 19, 1996, at 40; Animal-to-Human Trans-
plants Raise Concerns, AIDS WKLY. PLUS, Mar. 18, 1996, at 32.
152. Id.
153. See Fricker, supra note 151, at 457. "The Center for Disease Control and Preven-
tion have been monitoring Getty for baboon-derived infections and have as yet found no
evidence that baboon viruses or other infections have been transmitted." Id.
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D. The Ethics
1. Informed Consent
In addition to informed consent requirements found in the HHS regu-
lations,' 54 the Guidelines propose that several new elements be disclosed
to the potential subject. These would include:
The potential for infection from zoonotic agents known to be
associated with the donor species. The potential for transmis-
sion of unknown xenogeneic infectious agents to the recipi-
ent. . . . The potential risk of transmission of xenogeneic
infectious agents to the recipient's family or close contacts, espe-
cially sexual contacts .... Any need for isolation procedures dur-
ing hospitalization . . . and any specialized precautions (e.g.,
dietary, travel) following hospital discharge. . . . The need to
comply with long-term or potentially life-long surveillance ne-
cessitating routine physical evaluations. . . . The need for the
subject to inform the investigator or his/her designee of any
change in address or telephone number in order to maintain ac-
curate data for long-term health surveillance .... [and] Access
by the appropriate health agencies to all medical records.... 55
These informed consent requirements point to several of the difficulties
that could be encountered in an attempt to enforce a restrictive informed
consent requirement. The United States Supreme Court generally re-
gards restrictions on travel and one's right to privacy as constitutionally
suspect. 56 Yet, the Guidelines would require subjects to agree to restric-
tions on those rights to be eligible for the xenotransplant procedure.
Should an unhappy xenotransplant recipient subsequently file suit, a judi-
cial decision overturning the restrictions as unconstitutional would erode
the public safety measures. Should an individual successfully petition a
court to overturn restrictions imposed by the IRB, all efforts to monitor
the recipient's close contacts would fail. In the event that the recipient
decides to suspend his or her compliance with the program, and carries a
latent virus, a way to contain the damage may not exist.
154. See supra notes 66 and 71 and accompanying text.
155. See Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xeno-
transplantation, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,920, 49,923 (1996).
156. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees a fundamental right to privacy); see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that a residency requirement to obtain welfare aid
violated an individual's right to interstate travel).
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2. Risk to Third Parties
Unlike risks associated with allotransplantation, xenotransplantation
presents an unidentifiable and unquantifiable risk to third parties. 5 7 The
risk to the recipient is real and swift because the organ might be rejected
or a zoonotic infection could result in death. Nonetheless, the recipient
probably is undergoing the procedure as a last alternative. 158 The ques-
tion that must be asked is whether it is ethically justifiable to hold one
person's life more heavily in the balance than that of another. This is a
difficult question to resolve. When coupled with the potential infection
of significant numbers of people, the balance begins to tip more heavily in
favor of erring on the side of caution.
E. The Nuffield Council Report
The Nuffield Council Report (Nuffield Report), which preceded the
IOM report, responded to an announcement by Imutran, Ltd. that it
would begin xenotransplantation trials in 1996.' The Nuffield Report
stresses that the presentation of such issues is urgent due to "the continu-
ing shortfall of human donation to meet the growing demand for organ
transplantation; growing uncertainty about the risk of potential transmis-
sion of diseases by xenografts; public concern about the proper use of
genetic modification of animals; [and] wide and increasing concern about
animal welfare., 1 60
Before considering measures to safeguard xenotransplantation proce-
dures, the Nuffield Report considers more traditional alternatives. First
on this list is an attempt to decrease the demand for organs by increasing
the level of public health. For example, "the major causes of liver failure
in the UK are alcoholism, infection with hepatitis viruses and drug intoxi-
cation. '' 161 Many hope that by decreasing the number of people needing
157. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) committee concluded, "although the degree of
risk cannot be quantified, it is unequivocally greater than zero." (emphasis in original). See
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 2.
158. "If the risk of xenotransplant-associated infections is restricted to the recipient, it
simply constitutes one more factor affecting the risks and benefits of transplantation.
However, there may be wider implications for the human community." See Chapman et
al., supra note 4, at 1498-99.
159. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at Preface. "[T]hese con-
cerns have been highlighted by the announcement in September 1995 by the UK company
Imutran, Ltd. that, in the light of its research with pigs and monkeys, it envisaged the first
xenografts of transgenic pig hearts into human patients taking place in 1996." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at para. 2.2.
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organ transplants from self-inflicted causes, the supply of human organs
will go to truly needy recipients, and far fewer people will be in need.
Another, more traditional approach would be to increase the supply of
organs by increasing the number of intensive care units, the primary
source of most organ donations. 162
The United Kingdom faces problems similar to the United States con-
cerning the legal approach to organ donation.'63 While polls in the U.K.,
like those in the U.S., show that organ donation is widely supported by
the population, still relatives are able to withhold consent.164 Placing pa-
tients who will inevitably die on elective ventilation to preserve organs
for transplantation is controversial; not only is it currently illegal, but con-
flicts with the underlying premise of medical treatment being in the best
interests of the patient.' 65 Regardless of a possible increase in the
number of organs made available by the aforementioned procedures, the
report concludes that an undersupply is unavoidable.'66 Based on the
inability to bridge the gap between organ demand and organ supply, even
taking into account the use of artificial mechanical devices, the report
concludes that xenotransplants must be considered.167 Due to the highly
speculative possibilities for success of xenotransplants, the Nuffield Re-
port argues it would be ethically impermissible to proceed with human
trials until an Advisory Committee on Xenotransplantation is formed by
the U.K. Department of Health.'68 Any experiments done with human
subjects would be under the review of Local Research Ethics Commit-
tees, 69 which are similar to Institutional Review Boards in the United
States.
In addition, animal rights issues will be raised. One consideration is
whether widespread breeding of animals explicitly for use as organ do-
nors is ethical. The Nuffield Report "accepts the principle that in some
cases, the saving of human life or of significantly enhancing its quality
may justify a certain amount of animal suffering, provided this is kept to a
minimum."' 7 ° Arguments of speciesism were addressed in the report
along with conscientious objectors who, for religious or other reasons,
162. Id. at para. 2.3.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
164. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at para. 2.7.
165. Id. at para. 2.9.
166. Id. at para. 2.10.
167. Id. at para. 2.32.
168. Id. at para. 10.31.
169. Id. at para. 10.33.
170. Id. at para. 4.7.
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would object to procedures involving transplantation of animal organs or
tissues.1 71 On this issue, the Nuffield Report concludes that non-human
primates should be excluded from xenotransplantation studies to the
greatest extent possible and if other alternatives, such as the use of pigs,
prove workable, then non-human primates should be excluded
altogether.17
2
F. The IOM Report
In 1995, a workshop was held by the Institute of Medicine to discuss
the various considerations raised by xenotransplantation. The result was
a report (IOM Report), which was a compilation of the various presenta-
tions. It is less comprehensive in many respects than the Nuffield Report,
but its importance lies in the fact that it serves as part of the basis on
which the Guidelines were drafted. Because the public health concerns
are real, the IOM Report recommends instituting a program consisting of
the following four parts: research, risk assessment, risk management, and
risk communication.17 3 Risk assessment and communication of that risk
present problems because of the uncertain nature of the risk.' 74 Risk
management would be available before the procedure by conducting a
careful pretransplant screening of the animal and the material to be trans-
planted. After the procedure, a post-transplant screening of the recipient
and the transplant would be conducted."7 5 Further risk management
tools include lifetime surveillance of the recipient and careful archiving of
tissue from both the animal and the recipient.' 6 Also surveillance would
have to cover the health care workers involved and the family of the
recipient.177
Another method of decreasing the risks of disease transmission is to
develop specific-pathogen-free (SPF) animals to be used as donors of
both organs and tissues.'7 8 Expense and time impede the effectiveness of
developing SPFs, and even an SPF animal is only free of those pathogens
specified. 917  For instance, a significant amount of time would be required
171. "Speciesism" is the belief that singling out humans is a form of discrimination
based on ones species. See id. at para. 4.13, 4.23.
172. Id. at para. 4.40.
173. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 45.
174. Id. at 46-47.
175. Id. at 47.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 49.
179. Id. at 49-50.
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to develop an SPF baboon colony. Baboons take five to seven years to
reach sexual maturity and, like human births, are usually single.' 8 °
A national registry would be an important component of a successful
strategy to minimize the impact, if any, on the public health, should a
zoonotic infection occur.'8 1 But a concentrated number of illnesses, as
opposed to several scattered ones, is usually required before an outbreak
can be detected.182 A national registry alongside an archive of tissue
samples hopefully would be able to provide an ability to investigate the
event and hasten the response time.'83
The IOM Report also notes several concerns surrounding the procure-
ment of organs for transplantation. Many people are distrustful of the
current organ procurement system, fearing that this "could easily lead to
the perception that animal organs as experimental therapies will be of-
fered to desperately sick people who lack the financial resources or are
members of racial or ethnic minorities." '84 Also some critics express a
concern that because the organ donation system is so fragile, early re-
ports, which may be over-enthusiastic regarding the success of xenotrans-
plants, will diminish the overall number of human organs donated.1
85
G. Comparing the Nuffield Council Approach to the Institute of
Medicine Approach'86
Perhaps the most noticeable difference in these two approaches is with
respect to using non-human primates as donors. The IOM Report recom-
mends that SPF animals be used as donors, 87 but says nothing about
restricting non-human primates from the donor pool. The Nuffield Re-
port, however, recommends that early trials should exclude non-human
primates for both ethical and virulogical reasons. 88 This difference is
180. Id. at 49.
181. Id. at 54.
182. Id. at 55.
183. Id. at 56.
184. Id. at 67.
185. Id. at 69.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2.
188. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at para. 10.11
The routine use of higher primates to supply organs for xenotransplantation on a
scale sufficient to meet the organ shortage would represent a new use of primates
in the UK .... The potential risk of extinction, even to a species like the baboon
that is not currently endangered, must be taken seriously. Xenotransplantation
using primate organs or tissues may pose particular risks of disease transmission.
Id. at para. 10.11 (citations omitted).
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partly a result of the varying degrees of emphasis that the two groups
placed on the rights of the donor animals. The Nuffield Report empha-
sized maintaining the dignity of the animals in the process. 189 After a
brief overview of the two competing philosophical views towards animal
rights, the utilitarian against the Kantian rights approach, the IOM Re-
port concluded that, "although no philosophical or ethical consensus has
emerged, most people would favor proceeding with well-designed xeno-
transplantation experiments that begin with baboons, but would favor the
use of swine if these animals prove to be a viable source of organs for
humans."'" An interesting proposal in the Nuffield Report is to lower
the demand for organs by increasing overall public health and aware-
ness.' 9' The recommendation section of the IOM Report includes no
such suggestion.
H. The Guidelines
While not binding, the Guidelines are intended to present information.
Issuance of the Guidelines was not intended to be an endorsement of
beginning clinical xenotransplantation trials, nor was it intended to sug-
gest that funds would be routed to institutions pursuing the procedure. 92
Advocates call for periodic review and modification of the Guidelines as
scientific advances are made. 9 3 The Guidelines' objective is to "present
measures that can be used to minimize the risk to the public of human
disease due to known zoonoses and emerging xenogeneic infectious
agents arising from xenotransplantation."' 94 The Guidelines break down
into four main sections: xenotransplantation protocol issues, animal
sources, clinical issues, and public health needs.
189. See id. at para. 4.13. In fact, the Council reprinted a submission that maintained
xenotransplantation was nothing more than speciesism, and that the procedure was a new
form of slavery. Id.
190. INsTrTrrE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 78. The data suggests that baboons
would not be ideal donors because of the long gestation period, the fact that most baboons
give singular birth, and their relatively small numbers in captivity.
191. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 10, at para. 2.2. "One possible way
of bridging the gap between supply and demand is to reduce the demand for human organs
and tissue by introducing public health measures to prevent the conditions that currently
require treatment by transplantation." Id. "[Tihe major causes of liver failure in the UK
are alcoholism, infection with hepatitis viruses and drug intoxication." Id.
192. Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xenotrans-
plantation, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,920, 49,921 (1996).
193. Id. at 49,922.
194. Id.
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1. Protocol Issues
Xenotransplantation protocol issues include the composition of the
transplant team, the maintenance of the site at which the procedure is
performed, surveillance plans, and informed consent proposals.' 95 Pro-
posals recommend but do not require, that the xenotransplant team be
composed of at least one epidemiologist, one transplant immunologist,
one member with a veterinary medicine background, and another with an
infectious disease specialty. 96 Clinical site suggestions include requiring




In the animal sources section, the Guidelines deal with the procure-
ment of animals, screening of animals, and maintenance facilities, includ-
ing both record maintenance and animal surveillance. These records
should include details of the animal's contacts and lineage.' 98 Although
the Guidelines propose that SPF animals be the sole xenotransplant do-
nors, like the IOM report does, the regimen is fairly exacting.' 99 Specifi-
cally excluded from animal housing facilities should be any animal with
any documented illness including, but not limited to: bovine spongiform
ecephalpopathy (BSE), the so-called "mad cow disease;" wild-caught ani-
mals; imported or first generation animals; and, any slaughterhouse ani-
mals.200 Animal activity will be monitored and restricted so that anything
from the outside environment that could potentially transmit a pathogen
is kept out of contact with the animals in the facility. This includes moni-
toring the feed given to the animals and animal contact with human care-
takers.20 ' After an animal has reached the appropriate age and is
deemed suitable as a donor, the animal is placed in quarantine. This oc-
curs, though, only if a period of greater than three months has elapsed
from the time when the animal was initially deemed suitable as a do-
nor.20 2 Once tissues are selected for use in a xenotransplantation, they
195. Id. at 49,922-23.
196. Id. at 49,920, 49,922.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 49,923-49,926.
199. See id. at 49,923.
200. Id. at 49,923.
201. Id. at 49,924.
202. Id. at 49,925.
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should undergo further tests for the presence of any pathogens. 2 3 A full
necropsy will be performed on the animal, and appropriate quantities of
tissue and biologic samples will be archived.2 °4
3. Clinical Issues
The clinical issues section more thoroughly discusses surveillance of the
recipient, including his/her contacts and clinical records. The recipient
will be informed that any unexplained illnesses should be reported to the
clinical center immediately and that the recipient should inform his/her
close contacts of the need to do the same if they should experience any
unexplained illnesses.2 °5 The clinical center also is responsible for main-
taining certain levels of biologic specimens including safeguarding the
samples' continued storage. 0 6
4. Public Health
Finally, in the section dealing with public health needs, the Guidelines
recommend the establishment of a national registry to "allow the accu-
rate linkage of these events to exposures on a national level ....
Additionally, tissue, plasma, and leukocytes are recommended as materi-
als to be archived.20 8 The location of the specimens and the nature of the
archived specimens should be placed in the health care records to allow
access as required. 20
9
I. The Guidelines' Variances From the IOM Recommendations
One critical area where the Guidelines differ from the recommenda-
tions of the IOM Report is whether the Guidelines are mandatory or
precatory. The IOM Report recommends that "adherence to specific na-
tional guidelines be required of all experimenters and institutions that
undertake xenotransplantation trials in humans."21 But, "[t]he draft
guideline is intended to provide information and does not set forth re-
quirements., 211 Following the ninety day comment period, the PHS will
203. Id. at 49,926.
204. A necropsy is a post-mortem examination of the animal's cells. Id. at 49,926.
205. Id. at 49,926-49,927.
206. Id. at 49,926.
207. Id. at 49,928.
208. Id. at 49,929.
209. Id.
210. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 3.
211. See Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xeno-
transplantation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 49,921.
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issue a revised draft guideline. 12 Thus, whether the final guidelines will
demand adherence is unclear.
The IOM Report also recommends that HHS coordinate the various
entities developing, overseeing, and evaluating the Guidelines.213 How-
ever, the Guidelines do not provide for an administrative oversight
body.214 Additionally, the IOM Report warns that "a real danger exists
that the commercial applications of xenotransplant technology will out-
strip both the research base and the national capacity to address special
issues raised by xenotransplantation, including the risk of disease trans-
mission." '15 It, therefore, recommends that "funding, by federal agen-
cies, private industry, and other sources, of research and other programs
(e.g., tissue banks and patient registries) necessary to minimize the risk of
disease transmission" '16 is justified. Again, the Guidelines do not include
this recommendation.217
J. Scientific Concerns
One prominent virologist, Jonathan Allan,218 is quite reticent about be-
ginning xenotransplantation trials.219 Allan argues that "[d]espite all the
best efforts to provide [a] 'clean' baboon for donating organs or cells to
humans, the best strategy for preventing xenotransmission is still not to
do them.,2 2 0 Allan points to the AIDS epidemic as a example of a zoo-
notic disease that continues to plague modern medicine.2 21 This is not to
say that AIDS is in any way related to a xenotransplant, merely that zoo-
noses are neither an unknown phenomenon, nor an abstract danger. In-
stances of zoonotic agents being transmitted from poliovirus vaccines are
well documented.222 SV40, a monkey DNA virus inadvertently transmit-
ted to humans through a vaccination, "suggest[s] that monkey viruses
212. Id.
213. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 4.
214. See Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xeno-
transplantation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 49,920.
215. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 4.
216. Id.
217. See Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xeno-
transplantation, 61 Fed. Reg. at 49,920.
218. Dr. Allan participated in the panels that authored the IOM Report. See INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at List of Participants.
219. See generally, Allan, supra note 75.
220. Id. at 45.
221. Id. at 38.
222. Id. at 39.
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may play a role in human cancer .. .. ,,22 Allan also notes that human
organ shortage is not the only reason for proposing baboons as donors,
but rather because baboons are resistant to infection with several human
viruses, and could serve additional curative purposes.224 If this is correct,
several additional questions are raised about the propriety of undergoing
xenotransplantation trials before proper safeguards are enacted to pre-
vent transmission to third parties.
It has been suggested that, because evolution is a continual process of
changing DNA, xenotransplantation is not unnatural. Allan disputes this
assertion noting that "[a]ll major natural barriers to viral infections that
have evolved during the millennia will have been circumvented by a sin-
gle surgical procedure., 225 Rather than being a natural process, accord-
ing to Allan's view, xenotransplantation would destroy evolutionary
trends geared towards fighting off viruses. Bone marrow chimerism
hopefully will minimize this danger to the recipient.22 6 Even though the
recipient may, through chimerism, fight off the infection, the danger is
transferred to the close contacts of the recipient, whose immune system is
not similarly prepared by a chimerism.227 Spread of an infection to a
third party is dangerous because "the more difficult viruses to detect and
eliminate will be sexually transmitted or blood borne, similar to
AIDS., 228 Success in controlling infections has not been with slow
methodical diseases like AIDS and hepatitis, but with diseases that kill
quickly. 229 Once xenotransplantations begin, according to Allan, it will
no longer be a question of whether baboon and other donor animal vi-
ruses will enter the population, but how serious the effects will be.23 °
IV. SHOULD XENOTRANSPLANTATION TRIALS PROCEED?
To this question the U.K. answered a resounding "maybe" on January
16, 1997.231 U.K. Secretary of State for Health, Stephen Dorrell, cited
insufficient medical information and a corresponding risk to the public
223. Id.
224. Id. at 40.
225. Id. at 45.
226. See supra notes accompanying text 98-101.
227. Allan, supra note 75, at 44-45.
228. Id. at 44.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 45.
231. UK to Ban Pig Transplants to Humans, Says Dorrell, MARKET LETTER, Jan. 20,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7972243.
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health as reasons for delaying the approval of clinical trials.2 32 Imutran,
the British biotech company, was ready to proceed with clinical trials us-
ing genetically modified pigs, but a discovery of a hitherto unknown virus
by Professor David Onions raised severe concerns.2 33 Further, the Brit-
ish decided to appoint Lord Habgood of Calverton 234 to chair the U.K.
Xenotransplantation Interim Regulatory Authority.235 Finally, Parlia-
ment is expected to enact legislation pertaining to xenotransplantation,
and will, if necessary, enact emergency legislation to prohibit human tri-
als.2 36 The U.S. Congress should follow the British lead by taking an ac-
tive role in the formulation of U.S. policy on xenotransplantations;
otherwise, it will be abdicating its responsibility to the executive branch
with painfully slow results. Finally, it is important to note that xenotrans-
plantation presents an international problem, as well as a domestic one,
because viruses are not restricted by national boundaries. Accordingly,
the World Health Organization is preparing international guidelines on
xenotransplantation.237
A. The Comments238
A wide range of comments were submitted ranging from exuberant
praise239 to sharp criticism. 24° Several companies in the biotechnology
industry filed a joint comment, agreeing with certain portions of the regu-
232. Id.
233. Onions, of Glasgow Veterinary School, found a pig retrovirus and is currently con-
ducting more tests in an effort to determine whether it is capable of causing harm to
humans. See Charles Arthur, Transplants? Pigs Might Fly, THE INDEP.- LONDON, Jan. 20,
1997, at 20.
234. Lord Hapgood's choice was criticized because he is not "an expert on the safety of
transplant procedures, but ... a former archbishop who, 40 years ago, was a pharmacolo-
gist." Editorial, Have A Pig's Heart, 349 THm LANCET 219, 257 (1997).
- 235. UK to Ban Pig Transplants to Humans, Says Dorrell, supra note 231, at 1997 WL
7972243.
236. Charles Arthur, Study Will Be Key to Pig Transplants, THE INDEP.- LONDON, Jan.
17, 1997, at 4.
237. See David Shapiro, The Wrong Issue for a Moral Panic, THE FINANCIAL TIMES,
June 13, 1997, at 14.
238. Pursuant to the Draft Guidelines' call for Comments, several organizations and
individuals submitted comments on the proposed Guidelines in an effort to influence the
final Guidelines. See Comments Submitted to the Food and Drug Administration, Docket
No. 96M-0311. (on file with the Food and Drug Administration's Dockets Management
Branch).
239. See Comments of Ava D. Lancaster, President, Association for Professionals in
Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc., submitted to the Food and Drug Admin. (Dkt.
No. 96M-0311) (Comment 86), at 1 (Dec. 20, 1996).
240. See Comments of Richard E. Kruger, Director, Regulatory Affairs, Grace Bi-
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lations, provided they remain flexible and non-mandatory.24t In contrast,
groups wholly opposed to any effort to begin xenotransplantation clinical
trials submitted comments.2 42
An interesting, but not surprising, breakdown can be seen by looking at
the respondent's financial stake in the commencement of clinical trials.
Biotechnology firms were the most adamant to downplay the risks of
clinical trials.24 3 One company felt that access by appropriate health
agencies to the records would violate an individual's right to privacy, and
requiring autopsies to be performed would violate religious freedom.2 44
Still another company argued that only direct testing of the sample would
provide the safest alternative to justify clinical trials.2 45 According to this
company, it alone possessed the technology to test the needed tissue.24 6
A high level of self-interest surrounds the comments submitted, espe-
cially those from the biotechnology companies, because to the winners go
the spoils, to the tune of some six billion dollars a year.24 7 This is not to
say that those with a smaller financial stake are not interested in the final
guidelines. Even a nurses' association submitted comments to ensure
their members would not be left without financial reward in the final
guidelines.2 4a
omedical, submitted to the Food and Drug Admin. (Dkt. No. 96M-0311) (Comment No.
93), at 9 (Dec. 20, 1996).
241. See Comment of Allan Goldhammer, Director of Technical Affairs, Biotechnology
Industry Organization, submitted to the Food and Drug Admin. (Dkt. No. 96M-0311)
(Comment No. 75), at 1 (Dec. 20, 1996).
242. See Comments of Jonathan S. Allan, et al., Southwest Foundation for Biomedical
Research, submitted to the Food and Drug Admin. (Dkt. No. 96M-0311) (Comment No.
83), at 1 (Dec. 20, 1996); see Comments of Neal D. Barnard, President, Physician's Com-
mittee for Responsible Medicine, submitted to the Food and Drug Admin. (Dkt. No. 96M-
0311 (Comment No. 73), at 1 (Dec. 19, 1996).
243. See Comments of Mathias Hukkelhoven, et al., Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.,
submitted to the Food and Drug Admin. (Dkt. No. 96M-0311) (Comment No. 85), at 1
(Dec. 20, 1996). Sandoz Pharmaceuticals is a conglomeration of three corporations work-
ing together on developing xenogeneic pigs. These corporations are: Sandoz, Imutran,
Ltd., and Biotransplant, Inc. Commenting on the informed consent requirements, Sandoz
recommends that "[ilt should be made clear that there is an undefined but probably small
risk of infection." Id. at 3.
244. See Comments of Richard E. Kruger, supra note 240, at 2-3.
245. See Comments of Anton-Lewis Usala, Chairman and Chief Technical Officer, En-
celle, Inc., submitted to the Food and Drug Admin. (Dkt. No. 96M-0311) (Comment No.
84), at 1 (Dec. 20, 1996).
246. Id.
247. See Comments of the Medical Modernization Committee, submitted to the Food
and Drug Admin. (Dkt. No. 96M-0311) (Comment No. 91), at 16 (Dec. 20, 1996).
248. See Comments of Christy A. Price, President, American Nephrology Nurses'
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Not all of the comments, however, were generated out of financial self-
interest. One group that staunchly opposes beginning clinical trials sub-
mitted a comment based on its ethical position against animal experimen-
tation.249 Furthermore, per the solicitation in the preamble of the
Guidelines, comments were submitted by interested parties, and the fact
that they were self-interested is readily evident. Nevertheless, the degree
of self-interest from the biotechnology companies recalls the warnings of
the IOM's Report concerning the danger of commercial applications out-
stripping the scientific base.2
If there is any general consensus among the comments, it would appear
to address the informed consent requirement section of the Guidelines.
For example, although one group called the Guidelines excellent and an-
other called for more regulation, if not an outright prohibition of clinical
trials, both agreed that informed consent requirements need to be im-
proved.25' The groups differ on whether the transplant team must be re-
quired to provide the information concerning risks to close contacts.2 52
Another area of consensus, which appears amongst the submissions of
biotechnology companies, concerns maintenance of archive samples.
Most of the companies agreed that the responsibility to maintain
archives, and to track donors, should be left to them.25 3 Essentially, the
argument is that only the companies have the requisite expertise to per-
form maintenance of samples and tracking of individuals. 4
V. CONCLUSION
Ample scientific evidence indicates that the risks of xenotransplanta-
Ass'n, submitted to the Food and Drug Admin. (Dkt. No. 96M-0311) (Comment No. 81),
at 1 (Dec. 20, 1996).
249. See Comments of the Medical Modernization Committee, supra note 247, at 1.
250. See INSTITrurE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 96. Another illustration of this is the
PPL Therapeutic Company's decision to begin cloning pigs for use in xenotransplantation
despite concerns surrounding the two technologies. Scientists Serve Up the Prospect of
Cloned Pigs, THE INDEP.-LoNDON, Mar. 25, 1997, at 5.
251. See Comments of Ava D. Lancaster, supra note 239, at 4; Comments of Jonathan
S. Allan, et al., supra note 242, at 2.
252. See Comments of Ava D. Lancaster, supra note 239, at 4, saying, "The consent
form should state that counseling is available for close contacts." Id. Compare Comments
of Jonathan S. Allan, et al., supra note 242, at 2 saying, "Leaving the responsibility for
educating contacts as to potential infections with the recipient is inappropriate and has
been generally ineffective for other known human infectious diseases." Id.
253. See Comments of Allan Goldhammer, supra note 241, at 5; see also Comments of
Mathias Hukkelhoven, et al., supra note 243, at 2.
254. "[M]uch of this expertise can and should be provided by the company's experts."
Comments of Mathias Hukkelhoven, supra note 243, at 2.
158 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:127
tion are real and unquantifiable. Correspondingly, there is also a real
shortage of human organs available for transplantation. Herein lies the
dilemma. Every year, real people, not just statistical figures, die because
of an inability to find a compatible organ; the pleas by these people and
their families are well documented and difficult to ignore.255 What must
be balanced against this is the abstract risk associated with xenotrans-
plantation. It is difficult to quantify the potential risks that exist and for
this reason, if for no other, it seems likely that xenotransplantation trials
will eventually begin. The recent procedure, which placed bone marrow
from a baboon into a human, points to the likelihood that a slow prag-
matic approach is unlikely to be taken when human beings are in dire
need.
Nevertheless, throwing caution to the wind is not a desirable ap-
proach, 6 nor is it advocated by anyone. A more prudent approach, es-
pecially at the beginning, is necessary because the risks are tremendously
uncertain.2 57 Early recipients who are presented with no alternatives
short of a xenotransplantation are likely to agree to a great many restric-
tions that seem reasonable at the time.2 58 If the early procedures are
successful enough to allow recipients to restore a degree of normalcy to
their lives, then enforcement mechanisms will be required. It will be nec-
essary to ensure that surveillance is complied with and that any close con-
tacts of the recipient are adequately identified. Assuring confidentiality
in this regard will be crucial in gaining the recipient's trust, thereby in-
creasing the likelihood of total disclosure. Modifying human behavior
has proven to be a daunting task, and a largely undesirable one, so the
problem becomes enforcing the surveillance requirements if compliance
is not provided voluntarily. Another troubling aspect is that if something
occurs it is only possible to react in the hope that enough preventive
measures were taken. All of the measures taken to establish a national
registry, archive tissue samples, and monitor close contacts and health
care workers are proactive; but, they can only be implemented reactively.
Once an infection has occurred, and if it is passed from the recipient to a
255. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 3, at 58-61.
256. Id. at 45-46.
257. See Stephenson, supra note 27, at 285. "[Mlany scientists and public health ex-
perts, citing potential infectious disease risks in grafting animal organs into the human
body, say that xenotransplantation efforts should move slowly until such hazards can be
properly assessed." Id.
258. Jeff Getty himself said in response to a question about public health risks, "[I] am
more than willing to be quarantined, isolated or whatever it takes to satisfy the safety
requirements." See CNN Transcript No. 996-3, July 14, 1995.
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third party, the only thing to do is to prevent the infection from spreading
further. 59
While the Guidelines address the surveillance requirements and travel
restrictions the recipient must observe, they are only suggestions and are
not mandatory. Even if they were mandatory, the Guidelines did not dis-
cuss whether failure to agree to comply will disqualify the potential recip-
ient for the xenotransplantation.2 6 ° If a recipient agrees to comply before
the procedure but ignores the requirements after the procedure, what can
be done is an area which needs to be addressed.
Prior to the procedure going forward, an IRB should be required to
approve the transplant after heavily weighing the alternatives. In balanc-
ing alternatives, there should be a presumption of foregoing the proce-
dure. An equivalent to a guardian ad litem should be appointed by the
IRB to argue on behalf of third parties' interests. If the IRB determines
to move forward with the procedure, the recipient should be informed of
all risks involved, both known and unknown, and of the danger of trans-
mission to third parties. When this information is presented to the pa-
tient it should be done by a party not otherwise involved in the
procedure, and it should be in the presence of the potential recipient's
next of kin. Doctors should disclose, to recipients, the mandatory re-
quirements of xenotransplantation including compliance with surveil-.
lance, restrictions on travel and other restrictions, which may arise
dependent on varying circumstances. A list of sanctions for failure to
comply also should be presented at this time. Only if the recipient agrees
to comply should the procedure go forward. If the recipient does not
agree, no prejudice should be made in their course of treatment, except
with regard to xenotransplantations.
Following the procedure, the clinical institution should be required to
monitor the recipient, and any deviation by the recipient should be re-
ported immediately to the IRB and to a committee within HHS formed
to coordinate the policies of the various federal agencies respecting xeno-
transplantation. Holding recipients responsible prior to the procedure
may not be possible, and draconian enforcement measures against the
individual recipient may not be desirable. Therefore, it would be reason-
able to levy sanctions against a clinical institution if any irregularities fol-
lowing the procedure were to occur. These sanctions could range from
259. Allan, supra note 75, at 45.
260. See Draft Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xeno-
transplantation, 61 Fed. Reg. 49,920, 49,923 (1996).
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suspension of accreditation, monetary fines, to federal investigation. It is
preferable to levy the sanctions against the institution because the incen-
tive to comply with the requirements lies with them and not the recipient.
VI. SUMMARY
The number of xenotransplantations may increase despite the many
concerns about the likelihood of spreading known and unknown infec-
tious diseases. Regardless of the safety precautions employed in the early
trials, the risks remain unknown. Zoonotic and even xenozoonootic dis-
eases are not remote possibilities; they exist in various forms and come
from various sources. The nature of transplantation requires the suppres-
sion of the immune system to levels where opportunistic infections may
take route. Even if procedures to avoid increased levels of immunosup-
pression to the recipient were successful, risk to third parties, whose im-
mune systems would not be equipped to fight off the infection, would
remain.
In this context, the PHS Guidelines provide a useful starting point, but
they do not go far enough. First, the Guidelines are merely suggestions;
this needs to be changed to require institutions undertaking xenotrans-
plantation research and clinical trials to comply with the Guidelines. Sec-
ond, every possible effort should be made to protect third parties from
disease transmission. This requires and justifies placing restrictions on
recipients that, in an ordinary context, would be unacceptable. Third, xe-
notransplantations should occur only after all other medical measures
have been exhausted. Until the time when disease transmission risks are
scientifically insignificant or cures for the transmitted diseases are found,
mandatory guidelines with stringent requirements are the best means of
balancing the interests of society against the potential beneficiaries of
xenotransplantation.
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